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I. INTRODUCTION 
It must be a rare occurrence that a tax deduction for one and 
the same expense is disallowed by two different courts in the 
same year on two entirely different and unrelated theories, and 
rarer still that both theories are wrong. But just that happened 
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. My thanks to Professor 
James Maule for his helpful comments and to my research assistant, Karen 
Cross. Thanks also to New York Law School for its generous support. 
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in the two 1995 decisions Stroud v. United Statesi in the district 
court for the District of South Carolina and Hawronsky v. 
Commissioner2 in the tax court. Three years later, yet a third 
unrelated and erroneous theory was invoked to deny the same 
deduction in Keane v. Commissioner,3 a 1998 Tax Court 
Memorandum Decision, which fails to mention either Stroud or 
Hawronsky. None of these decisions has been commented upon 
in the tax literature, but both Stroud and Hawronsky are 
routinely cited in reference works, with no hint of any suspicion 
that they are wrongly decided.4 
The deduction in question was for statutorily prescribed 
treble damages-and trebled deemed interest-paid by 
physicians whose medical education had been paid for by the 
National Health Service Corps (NHSC) in exchange for a 
contractual obligation to practice primary-care medicine at a site 
in an underserved area designated by the NHSC. The service 
obligation is for the greater of two years or one year for each 
school year for which a scholarship was granted.s Physicians 
who default on their service obligation are required by the 
statutorily prescribed terms of the contract to pay damages in the 
amount of triple the amount paid by the government plus triple 
an amount of deemed interest calculated as if the scholarship 
had been a loan at the highest prevailing rate.6 
Congress established the NHSC in 1970 and its Scholarship 
Program in 1976 for the purpose of alleviating the geographic 
and specialty maldistribution of physicians and other health 
practitioners in the United States.7 In order to assure the 
provision of primary health services, scholarships are granted to 
L 906 F. Supp. 990 (D.S.C. 1995). 
2. 105 T.C. 94 (1995). 
3. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2046 (1998). 
4. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. McMAHON, AND LAWRENCE A. 
ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS (3d ed. 2002). 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2541 (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b)(l)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
7. See generally Lora C. Siegler, Annotation, Validity and Construction of 
Provisions of National Health Service Corps Scholarship Program (42 USCS §§ 
2541 et seq.) with Respect to Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C.S. § 254o(b)(l)(A) for 
Recovery of Treble Damages from Scholarship Recipients Failing to Fulfill 
Obligations, 108 A.L.R. FED. 313, 319-23 (1992). 
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physicians, dentists, nurses, physician assistants, and other 
health professionals.a The scholarships provide both tuition and 
fees for health care training, and also a monthly stipend for 
living expenses.s During the years in question, the full amount 
of such payments was exempt from tax. The NHSC program is 
administered by the Public Health Service (PHS), an agency in 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
A scholarship recipient must sign a written contract obliging 
himself to serve a post-training period of obligated service in an 
area in which there is a shortage of health professionals.10 This 
service is always remunerated, and in the case of physicians, it 
may be satisfied by working directly for a governmental agency, 
or more often by working in a private clinic, or even by 
independent private practice, provided the location is approved 
by the NHSC.n The terms and conditions of the contract 
between the participant individual and the NHSC are statutorily 
prescribed and always include a fixed formula for the treble 
damages plus trebled interest for a participant's breach.12 
An earlier version of the statute in effect from 1972 until 
1977 required only single damages, that is, a return of the 
government's money plus deemed interest, as many similar State 
programs still do.13 The federal single-damages version was 
repealed in 1976 and the current triple-damage provision went 
into effect in 1977. The purpose of the new provision was 
evidently to give the NHSC a stiff penalty to help enforce the 
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 254l(a). 
9. See generally Siegler, supra note 7, at 320. 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 254l(b). 
11. Siegler, supra note 7, at 320 ("The requirement is for service in the full-
time practice of the recipient's profession, as either a member of the NHSC or a 
private practitioner, in an [Health Manpower Shortage Area] designated by the 
Secretary of the Department of HHS."). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b). The applicable formula in the cases at issue was a 
sum equal to three times the amounts actually paid by the government, plus 
three times "the interest on such amounts which would be payable if at the time 
the amounts were paid they were loans bearing interest at the maximum legal 
prevailing rate, as determined by the Treasurer of the United States[,]" 
multiplied by a fraction whose numerator is the months of unserved obligation 
and whose denominator is total months of service obligation. Id. 
13. Siegler, supra note 7, at 317-18. 
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scholarship participants' service obligation, and the NHSC has 
often used the threat of this penalty to coerce adherence to its 
detailed regulations and procedures. 
According to 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b)(l)(A), the treble damages 
are due if the participant fails to begin or to complete his service 
obligation "for any reason." The obligation of service or treble 
damages may be waived pursuant to regulations delegated to the 
HHS only if "compliance by the individual is impossible or would 
involve extreme hardship to the individual and if enforcement of 
such obligation with respect to any individual would be 
unconscionable."14 
The federal courts have decided more than three dozen 
reported cases over the question whether the treble-damages 
provision of the statutory contract is enforceable in a multitude 
of factual circumstances and under a variety of legal theories, but 
nearly all of the physicians who have resisted payment have 
lost.15 The reported cases nearly always arise from the system by 
which the NHSC assigns participants to locations for their tours 
of service.16 The assignment process is left to the discretion of 
the NHSC11 which determines, after consultation with state and 
local authorities, which locations qualify for status as Health 
Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA).1s Then, the NHSC 
annually prepares a list of available locations for which a 
participant may apply, the HPSA Opportunity List (HPOL). 
Only sites on the HPOL qualify for fulfillment of the service 
obligation. The earlier a participant applies, the better the 
choices. A participant who has not found a location by a certain 
time will be assigned by the NHSC to any location it chooses. If 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(d)(2). 
15. See generally Siegler, supra note 7, at 321-22. 
16. There is considerable friction between participants and the NHSC. A 
1990 study reported that 13% of participants had failed to complete their 
service obligations and paid damages instead. Another 1992 study reported 
considerable unhappiness among participants, many of whom felt they were 
treated like "indentured servants." See generally Kristine Marietti Byrnes, 
Note, Is there a Primary Care Doctor in the House? The Legislation Needed to 
Address a National Shortage, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 813 nn.68-69 (1994). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 254l(f)(l)(B)(iv). 
18. Formerly "HMSA" for "Health Manpower Shortage Area." 
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the NHSC declares a participant to be in default (because, for 
example, he failed to obtain permission for deferral from the 
NHSC in order to complete a residency, ·or because he was unable 
to find a qualifying site),19 the NHSC will always forbear to 
enforce the damages obligation if the participant will 
acknowledge his default and liability for treble damages and 
agree again to perform his service obligation by signing a 
"forbearance agreement."20 But those in default go to the bottom 
of the applicant list and have no choice as to where they will be 
assigned. So they often default again, and eventually are forced 
to pay. 
The tax question is whether the treble damages payment is 
deductible. In Stroud, the district court held against the 
taxpayer on the theory that, since the tuition and living stipend 
had been tax-exempt, l.R.C. § 265(a)(l)21 barred any deduction 
because the damages were expenses "allocable to" tax-exempt 
income.22 A deduction for current interest on the taxpayer's 
obligation to pay the treble damages was also denied.23 
In Keane, the taxpayer's deduction of interest payments on a 
promissory note for a reduced portion of the treble damages was 
denied on the theory that the origin of the government's 
compromised claim was a scholarship, and the interest was 
therefore student loan interest, which is personal and 
nondeductible under l.R.C. § 262 and l.R.C. § 163(h).24 
19. Disputes ending in default often arise because the participant's 
professional or personal situation may change during the five to eight years of 
his medical education, making the service obligation unexpectedly burdensome. 
For example, the participant may decide to specialize in a field which is 
unacceptable to the NHSC, or his family situation may make it inconvenient or 
impossible for him to serve at the site to which the NHSC assigns him. Very 
often the participant in default does in fact serve the poor, but disagrees with 
the HHSC as to whether the site of his practice does--or should-qualify as an 
approved site. 
20. See generally Siegler, supra note 7, at 350-359; United States v. 
Redovan, 656 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Pa. 1986); United States v. Beane, 1990 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 5776 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 1990). 
21. 1.R.C. § 265(a)(l) (2000). 
22. 906 F. Supp. at 993-94. 
23. Id. at 996. 
24. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2046. 
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In Hawronsky, the deduction was denied under the purported 
authority of I.RC. § 162(f), on the theory that the damages were 
in effect a "fine ... or similar penalt[y] paid to a Government for 
the violation of any law."25 The errors in Hawronsky will be 
treated in a companion article. 
The thesis of this article is that both Stroud and Keane were 
wrongly decided. The treble damages constituted a deductible 
business expense of buying out the NHSC service obligation. 
They were not incurred in order to obtain a tax-free scholarship 
which had been received many years earlier, but rather for the 
purpose of earning taxable income currently through medical 
practice elsewhere. I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) simply does not apply to 
these business damages. Current interest on the taxpayer's 
obligation to pay the treble damages in the future are a business 
expense for the same reason, and should be deductible unless 
barred as unreimbursed employee business interest, an 
argument which was not raised or discussed in either decision. 
II. STROUD AND I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) 
Dr. Nancy Stroud attended Tufts Medical School in 
Massachusetts from 1978 to 1982 and her medical education was 
paid for by an NHSC scholarship. Although Dr. Stroud was born, 
raised, and schooled in Massachusetts and would have preferred 
to remain there, she decided to perform her residency at the 
Medical University of South Carolina because she was advised 
that no positions for obstetricians were likely to become available 
in Massachusetts for her to perform her service obligation under 
the NHSC contract, but that such positions would be available in 
South Carolina. During the final year of her 1982-1986 
residency, Dr. Stroud was in constant contact with the PHS to 
discuss where she would perform her obligated service. It was at 
this time that she discovered that there were no openings for her 
specialty on the HPOL list for the entire state of South 
Carolina-despite the lack of obstetricians in five counties and a 
very high infant mortality rate.26 
25. Hawronsky, 105 T.C. at 97. 
26. Appellant's Brief at 5-9, Stroud v. United States, No. 95-3139, 1996 WL 
6 
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Dr. Stroud's husband had been a licensed real estate broker 
in South Carolina since 1980. By the time Dr. Stroud learned 
that the NHSC would not allow her to fulfill her service 
obligation in South Carolina, her husband could not abandon the 
real estate practice he had been building for six years, and she 
was forced to give notice to the NHSC that she would "financially 
fulfill" her service obligation. The NHSC placed her in default as 
of July 1, 1986.27 Dr. Stroud did not have the funds to pay the 
treble damages. After lengthy negotiations, she was allowed to 
pay the liquidated damages, plus interest, in installments, 
pursuant to a "Repayment Agreement" executed November 25, 
1987.28 The Strouds made payments under that Agreement in 
the years 1989, 1990, and 1991, and deducted both the principal 
of the treble damages (except for the original scholarship 
amount) and current interest on the note. The IRS invoked 
I.RC. § 265(a)(l) to deny the deductions and claimed that the 
treble damages and interest were allocable to tax-exempt 
income-the exempt scholarship. The Strouds paid the 
deficiencies and then sued for a refund. 
The government argued that the district court in Stroud 
should disallow the deduction under the I.RC. § 162(£) theory of 
Hawronsky, arguing that the damages were, in effect, a fine or 
penalty.29 Although he was aware of the Hawronsky decision and 
cited it,3o Judge Norton chose to consider only the I.RC. § 
265(a)(l) theory and did not take the easier route of simply 
following Hawronsky. If the reason was that he saw the 
weakness of the Hawronsky decision, he did not say so. 
It should be noted that the two theories are not quite 
equivalent in their effects because they may have contradictory 
implications for other tax issues. One such issue was present in 
Stroud-the deductibility of current interest paid on a 
promissory note to pay the NHSC damages over time. If the 
damages are a business expense, interest on them would be 
477240 (4th Cir. Aug. 23, 1996). 
27. Stroud, 906 F. Supp. at 991. 
28. Id. at 991-92. 
29. Id. at 993. 
30. Id. at 994 n.8. 
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deductible because the interest is not itself a penalty even if the 
principal is. But if the damages are a cost of earning tax-free 
income, presumably the interest is an additional cost of earning 
tax-free income, and so not deductible. 
A. Stroud aka GCM 39,336 
In Stroud, the district court incautiously relied on the 
government's General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 39,336,31 
which it found to be "clearly on point."32 The court first 
31. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,336 (October 12, 1984). 
32. 906 F. Supp. at 993. That it is "on point" is unsurprising, because this 
GCM is the IRS's internal memorandum of law underlying the advice it gave in 
a private letter ruling to another NHSC physician who was in precisely the 
same circumstances. 
GCM 39,336 begins by rejecting the correct proposal of the IRS Individual 
Tax Division to analyze the damages in three parts: a repayment of the 
scholarship itself, which would be nondeductible, and two deductible portions 
consisting of a "penalty" portion and the "interest," which was how the 
taxpayers in both Hawronsky and Stroud reported the damages. 
Despite the inauspicious beginning, GCM 39,336 then quite logically 
asserts that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to his scholarship, and that 
the damages became due solely as a result of the taxpayer's subsequent breach 
of the service agreement. The GCM then correctly states that the taxpayer 
incurred no indebtedness to the government upon receipt of the scholarship, 
and therefore no part of the damages constituted interest. 
At this point GCM 39,336 maintains that although the amount of the 
damages is calculated by reference to the amount of the scholarship received, 
the "nexus" between the scholarship and the damages "is not substantial 
enough" to apply the doctrine of United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 
(1969) (limiting taxpayer oil company's deduction for repayment of overcharges 
to customers for natural gas to 72Y.% because taxpayer had already enjoyed 
27Y.% depletion deduction when overcharges were received; denying double 
benefit of exclusion and deduction for the same item). This assertion seems 
erroneous because the taxpayer's compelled reimbursement of the original 
untaxed scholarship (a component of the treble damages) appears perfectly 
analogous to the Skelly Oil compelled reimbursement of (partially) untaxed oil 
revenues. 
Then GCM 39,336 acknowledges the general rule that a payment of 
damages for breach of an employment contract is deductible, citing Rev. Rul. 
67-48, 1967-1 C.B. 50 (holding deductible employee's payment of liquidated 
damages pursuant to employment contract for failure to complete agreed period 
of service after training because attributable to salary received). 
Just when one expects the inevitable conclusion that the damages are 
deductible in full because they are payable solely on account of the breach of 
8 
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considered and rejected the taxpayer's argument that Revenue 
Ruling 67-4833 permitted the deduction. That ruling held that an 
employee (coincidentally, a resident physician) could deduct an 
amount paid to a former employer as liquidated damages for 
breach of an employment contract by leaving before the end of 
the agreed term of employment as a loss under I.R.C. § 
165(c)(l).34 The court distinguished this ruling with two 
observations: first, that the taxpayer in the instant litigation had 
never been an employee of the government;35 and second, that 
contract, GCM 39,336 abruptly reverses course and invokes I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) to 
deny a deduction not just for the amount of the scholarship originally received, 
but for the entire treble damages payment, on the ground that all the damages 
are "directly allocable" to the tax-exempt scholarship. This breathtaking 
conclusion is buttressed solely by Manocchio v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 989, 994 
(1982), aff'd on other grounds, 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1983), which is itself 
erroneous and is criticized in detail below. 
The author of the 1984 GCM 39,336 must have been aware of the above-
cited appeal of Manocchio, which had been decided a year earlier, but he does 
not cite it. As explained below in Part Il.2., however, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
the tax court's reliance on I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) in Manocchio, and if the Ninth 
Circuit was correct, all authority for basing the conclusion in GCM 39,336 on 
I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) vanishes. 
33. Rev. Rul. 67-48, 1967-1 C.B. 50. 
34. The conclusion is correct, except that the deduction should have been 
allowed under I.R.C. § 162 rather than I.R.C. § 165. A "loss" (when the term 
refers to a particular item rather than to an overall loss) refers to a transaction 
in property, not to a payment in cash, except in special circumstances not 
relevant here, such as a "gambling loss" for which the tax term has been 
imported from ordinary non-tax usage. See RICHARD. A. WESTIN, SHEPARD'S TAX 
DICTIONARY (1993). 
35. GCM 39,336 distinguishes Rev. Rul. 67-48 for a different reason-on 
the ground that there the taxpayer's salary was taxable rather than tax-
exempt. However, a closer look leads to a different conclusion. The underlying 
Rev. Rul. 67-48 is I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,328 (Sept. 7, 1966), from which 
we learn that the first proposed version of the ruling would have divided the 
liquidated damages into two parts: a reimbursement of excess salary which is 
deductible, and a reimbursement of the cost of untaxed training, which is not. 
The training program was for resident physicians who were offered a higher 
initial salary if they agreed to remain as hospital staff for periods after their 
training was completed. (Why the cost of training, if repaid as damages, should 
not be deductible is not explained, and is anything but apparent. The repaid 
expenses would seem to fit squarely within the deductible expenses for business 
education allowed under Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5.) According to GCM 33,328, all 
the damages in fact represented a return of salary and should therefore be 
deductible. Nowhere, however, is there any suggestion that if some of the 
damages had been a nondeductible return of the value of untaxed training, that 
9 
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the NHSC contract is governed by statutory standards rather 
than contractual principles.36 The court failed to explain the 
relevance of these observations, and their relevance is far from 
obvious. In any event, the court then stated that because it 
agreed with GCM 39,336 that the payments at issue are 
nondeductible as allocable to tax-exempt income, it would decline 
to decide whether the payments are otherwise deductible under 
I.R.C. §§ 162 or 165.37 
Having cleared away this obstacle, the court found the 
question easy and the answer obvious. Were Dr. Stroud's treble 
damages payments (the deductions) allocable to tax-exempt 
income (the scholarship)? Clearly, yes. The nature of the tax-
exempt income is Dr. Stroud's scholarship; the relationship it 
bears to the deductions is one of direct causation. "The payments 
could hardly be more 'allocable' to the scholarship funds-they 
would not be owed without a breach of the scholarship 
agreement."38 
The taxpayer argued that the damages payments were not 
directly, but indirectly allocable to the scholarship, and that 
therefore only a reasonable proportion should be deemed 
nondeductible, citing subsection (c) of Treasury Regulations § 
1.265-1: 
Expenses and amounts otherwise allowable which are directly 
allocable to any class or classes of exempt income shall be 
allocated thereto; and expenses and amounts directly allocable 
to any class or classes of nonexempt income shall be allocated 
thereto. If an expense or amount otherwise allowable is 
indirectly allocable to both a class of nonexempt income and a 
class of exempt income, a reasonable proportion thereof 
determined in the light of all the facts and circumstances in 
this should result in denial of a deduction for the reimbursement of salary as 
well. Just the reverse was suggested-it was assumed that a proper allocation 
would be made, namely that the refund of salary would be deductible, and the 
refund of untaxed training costs would not. 
36. Stroud, 990 F. Supp. at 993 (citing United States v. Vanhorn, 20 F.3d 
104 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
37. Id. at 994. 
38. Id. 
10 
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each case shall be allocated to each.39 
The taxpayer contended that the payments at issue were 
indirectly allocable to both nonexempt income (her taxable 
income from private practice), and exempt income (the 
scholarship funds), and sought to analogize her case to Induni v. 
Commissioner. 40 
The taxpayer in Induni was employed by the United States 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in Canada and 
was entitled to receive a tax-exempt Living Quarters Allowance 
(LQA) intended to pay his rent and utilities. Instead of renting, 
the taxpayer bought a home and received a tax-free LQA equal to 
10% of the purchase price of the home. The taxpayer sought to 
deduct his mortgage interest and real property tax expenses 
relating to his residence, but the tax court denied the deductions 
to the extent that they were reimbursed by the tax-exempt LQA: 
"In our view, petitioner's mortgage interest and real property 
taxes are the housing expenses intended to be covered by the rent 
component of the LQA. As such, the deductions are indirectly 
allocable to a class of tax-exempt income within the meaning of 
section 1.265-l(c)[.]"41 
Judge Norton then stated that although the expenses for 
which the taxpayer in Induni claimed a deduction were not 
exactly the same expenses which the LQA was intended to cover, 
they were nevertheless "indirectly" allocable to the exempt LQA 
because they fit within the broader purpose of the LQA. Judge 
Norton then concluded: 
Here, this court need not make an analogy to find that the 
Plaintiffs' payments are allocable to Dr. Stroud's scholarship .. 
[T]he deductions are not indirectly allocable to the 
scholarship, but directly allocable to it. Furthermore, because 
the full amount of Plaintiffs' liability is directly allocable to the 
tax-exempt scholarship, "the entire deduction is disallowed 
without regard to the amount of exempt income actually 
39. Treas. Reg. 1.265-l(c). 
40. 98 T.C. 618 (1992), aff'd, 990 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1993) (disallowing home 
mortgage interest and property tax deductions to the extent the taxpayer 
received a tax-exempt government housing subsidy for living abroad). 
41. 906 F. Supp. at 995 (quoting Induni, 98 T.C. at 623). 
11 
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received."42 
Judge Norton's conclusions are based upon two related 
errors, both borrowed from GCM 39,336. First, after admitting 
that the damages are only due upon breach of the scholarship 
agreement, he conflates the breach with the scholarship itself. 
The breach is an independent business decision to buy out one 
taxable employment obligation in favor of another which 
occurred many years after the scholarship agreement was 
made.43 Second, Judge Norton misunderstood the meaning of 
"direct" and "indirect" allocations under the Regulations, which 
refer to classes of income, not to items of income. This 
misreading was necessary in order to make it appear that I.RC. 
§ 265(a)(l) applied in the first place. It did not. I.RC. § 265(a)(l) 
applies to the costs of earning tax-exempt income, and the treble 
damages are clearly not a cost of earning the scholarship; they 
are a cost of the breach of the service agreement. 
Going a little deeper, the Induni decision was irrelevant 
because it was itself erroneously based upon I.RC. § 265(a)(l). 
Housing expenses abroad are not a cost of earning the exempt 
LQA; they are a cost of living and working abroad. Although the 
result in Induni was correct, it should have been decided under 
the principle of I.RC. § 111.44 What Stroud and Induni have in 
common is that they represent opposite sides of a single problem: 
double tax benefits for a single tax item. In Stroud the taxpayer 
first received a tax-free item which she later repaid as an 
otherwise deductible expense, just as in United States v. Skelly 
Oil Co.,45 which should have governed the situation. In Induni, 
the taxpayer first paid an otherwise deductible expense for which 
he later received a tax-free reimbursement. In both cases a 
42. Id. (citing GCM 39,336). 
43. The issue of separating the scholarship from the breach will be 
discussed in the last section of this Article concerning Keane and the origin of 
the claim test. 
44. I.R.C. § 111 (2000). 
45. 394 U.S. 678 (1969) (limiting taxpayer oil company's deduction for 
repayment of overcharges to customers for natural gas to 72Y.% because 
taxpayer had already enjoyed 27Y.% depletion deduction when overcharges 
were received; denying double benefit of exclusion and deduction for the same 
item). 
12 
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double tax benefit should be avoided, but not by means of l.R.C. § 
265(a)(l), which does not apply to problems of transactional 
accounting such as these. In Induni the error was harmless 
because the right result was reached despite the misapplication 
of l.R.C. § 265(a)(l). In Stroud, however, the result was an 
absurdly incorrect disallowance of the entire treble damages and 
current interest, rather than the correct amount of the original 
scholarship alone. 
The illegitimate expansion of l.R.C. § 265(a)(l) into areas of 
transactional accounting for which it was not designed has a long 
and confusing history, but it aroused little or no opposition 
because it apparently, but only apparently, led to correct results. 
The courts did not parse the statute or Treasury Regulations 
under l.R.C. § 265(a)(l) very carefully as long as the IRS's result 
seemed correct, and by the time Stroud was decided, the 
misapplication of l.R.C. § 265(a)(l) in this area was already 
settled law. Without this prior body of erroneous doctrine, the 
fatal mistake made in Stroud would have been impossible. In 
order to appreciate how these errors came about, it is necessary 
to review some history. 
B. History of l.R.C. § 265(a)(l) 
The original predecessor of current l.R.C. § 265(a)(l) was 
enacted as section 24(a)(5) in the Revenue Act of 193446 in order 
to disallow deductions for the production of tax-exempt income. 
Such deductions would, in effect, shelter unrelated taxable 
income and provide an unwarranted double tax benefit. The 
specific situations Congress had before it when it enacted 
(former) section 24(a)(5) were: (1) expenses incurred for the 
purpose of producing exempt interest on state securities; (2) 
exempt salaries received by state employees; and (3) exempt 
income from leases of state school lands.47 The House version 
would have disallowed all such expenses. 
It is clear from the italicized words in the legislative history 
below that the statutory language "allocable to," later to cause 
46. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 683, 691. 
47. See generally id. at 683-84. 
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great confusion, should be read as interchangeable with "paid or 
incurred for the production of' tax-exempt income. The House 
Report states: 
Section 24(a)(5). Disallowance of deductions attributable 
to tax-exempt income: This paragraph has been added to the 
bill to eliminate as deductions from gross income expenses 
allocable to the production of income wholly exempt from the 
income tax. Under the present law interest on State securities, 
salaries received by State employees, and income from leases of 
State school lands are exempt from Federal income tax, but 
expenses incurred in the production of such income are 
allowable as deductions from gross income.48 
The Senate version adds the express proviso that such 
deductions are disallowed even if the tax exempt income fails to 
materialize, and also limits the provision to tax-exempt income 
other than interest, which was then dealt with in a separate 
provision. The Senate Report states: 
The House bill disallows amounts otherwise allowable as 
deductions which are allocable to one or more classes of tax-
exempt income even though the income fails to materialize or 
is received in an amount less than the expenditures made or 
incurred. For instance, under the present law, salaries 
received by State employees, income from leases of State school 
lands, and the interest on State and some classes of Federal 
securities are exempt from the income tax. It is contended that 
under the existing law all expenses incurred in the production 
of such income are allowable as deductions. The House bill 
specifically disallows expenses of this character. While your 
committee is in general accord with the House provision, it is 
not believed that this disallowance should be made to apply to 
expenditures incurred in earning tax-exempt interest. To do so 
might seriously interfere with the sale of Federal and State 
securities .... 49 
I.RC. § 265(a)(l) prohibits otherwise allowable deductions 
48. ROBERT L. DOUGHTON, REVENUE ACT OF 1934, H.R. REP. No. 73-704 
(1934), as reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 554, 571 (emphasis added). 
49. PAT HARRISON, REVENUE BILL OF 1934, S. REP. No. 73-558 (1934), as 
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 586, 606 (emphasis added). 
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for expenses which are allocable to classes of income (other than 
interest) which are wholly exempt from tax. Until Stroud, the 
provision had been applied-albeit in a haphazard manner-in 
essentially two different types of situations. The first is that 
which was originally contemplated by Congress when the 
provision was enacted: disallowance of direct costs of earning tax-
exempt income. Here would belong, for example, disallowance of 
deductions for legal fees in suits to acquire tax-exempt 
inheritances, damages for personal injuries, or for state and 
foreign income taxes imposed on items exempt from federal 
income tax. If the expenses are incurred to earn a mixture of 
taxable and tax-exempt income, they will be denied a deduction 
in the same proportion that the tax-exempt income bears to total 
income.5o 
The second situation, and one of more recent provenance, is 
the result of the IRS's efforts to extend the prohibition to disallow 
expenses for deductible items for which the taxpayer has 
arguably been paid reimbursement with tax-free grants in one 
form or another. GCM 34,50651 ably recounts the history and 
purpose of I.RC. § 265(a)(l), and concludes that Congress's 
intent requires that the provision be applied in only two 
situations: first, in the original situation in which the expense is 
incurred for the purpose of earning tax-exempt income; and 
second, where the taxpayer receives tax-exempt income which is 
earmarked for a particular purpose, and the taxpayer incurs 
expenses in carrying out that purpose.52 The GCM was only half 
right: the second application is erroneous, and is the root of the 
problem in Stroud. 
1. Revenue Ruling 83-3 and Its Erroneous Reimbursement 
Theory 
The IRS first published its new "reimbursement" theory in 
Revenue Ruling 83-3.53 It disallowed otherwise deductible 
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.265-l(c). 
51. l.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,506 (May 26, 1971). 
52. Id. at 14-15. 
53. Rev. Rul. 83-3, 1983-1 C.B. 72. 
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educational expenses when the taxpayer received a tax-free 
scholarship or tax-free veterans' educational benefit intended to 
subsidize the same· studies,54 and disallowed home mortgage 
interest and property deductions to the extent the taxpayer 
received a parsonage housing allowance, which is tax exempt 
under I.RC. § 107.55 Congress soon partially overruled the IRS 
on the "reimbursement" theory in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 by 
enacting I.RC. § 265(a)(6)(B)56 for the purpose of rescuing the 
home mortgage and property tax deductions for parsons and 
military personnel. A fascinating question involving fringe 
benefits generally lurks in these disputes but is beyond the scope 
of this article.57 
54. The tax court decided in favor of the IRS on this issue as early as 1952 
in Banks v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1386 (1952). After waffling back and forth, 
the IRS's current position was not announced in a published ruling until Rev. 
Rul. 83-3. 
55. I.R.C. § 107 (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
56. I.R.C. § 265(a)(6) provides that "[n]o deduction shall be denied under 
this section for interest on a mortgage on, or real property taxes on, the home of 
the taxpayer by reason of the receipt of an amount as-(A) a military housing 
allowance, or (B) a parsonage allowance excludible from gross income under 
section 107." 
57. The IRS has also disallowed-under the "original" use of I.R.C. § 
265(a)(l)-the reverends' trade or business deductions in proportion to the 
amount their tax-free parsonage allowance bears to their total trade or business 
income from the ministry, and this disallowance was approved by the tax court 
in Deason v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 465 (1964), and more recently in Dalan v. 
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 370 (1988). 
Very curiously, parsons seem to be the sole group which has been targeted 
for both the "original" and the "reimbursement" kinds of disallowance under 
I.R.C. § 265(a)(l). 
However, the "original" application of I.RC. § 265(a)(l) seems impeccable 
as applied to employee business expenses of all taxpayers who receive any tax-
free fringe benefits. Employees do after all earn both taxable and tax-exempt 
income from their business expenses. There is no apparent reason why the 
Deason doctrine·should not disallow all taxpayers' trade or business deductions 
in proportion to their receipt of all tax-exempt fringe benefits, not just the 
parsonage allowance, including, for example, the quite similar exclusion for 
employee housing provided for the benefit of the employer under I.R.C. § 119 
(2000). If such benefits as medical and life insurance and educational subsidies 
are included, the disallowance for many taxpayers might be very significant. 
For example, if tax-free fringe benefits represented one quarter of the value of 
an employee's total compensation, it should follow that one quarter of the 
employee's otherwise deductible employee business expenses should be denied 
under I.R.C. § 265(a)(l). Congress almost certainly did not intend this result. It 
16 
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Although the reimbursement cases have generally led to 
reasonable results, the use of I.RC. § 265(a)(l) in such situations 
stretches the meaning of "allocable to" beyond recognition and 
can easily create confusion5s and error. The risk of error derives 
from the fact that once an expense is found to be "allocable to" 
tax-exempt income, a deduction must be denied in its entirety 
even if it exceeds the amount of exempt income earned.59 
This rule makes perfect sense if it is limited to the direct 
costs of earning exempt income, and it has an exact parallel in 
the rules which deny deductions for personal living expenses 
altogether, whether or not the exempt consumption is actually 
received. Similarly, business deductions are generally allowed in 
full, whether or not the hoped-for business income is actually 
realized. If the taxpayer does not have sufficient business 
income for the year, the deductions are still allowable to offset 
other income or as a carryforward. All three rules apply to 
classes of income and expense, not to items. 
The case of reimbursements is entirely different. If a 
reimbursement is less than the otherwise deductible expense it 
pays for, denial of the entire deduction is inappropriate. In fact, 
the courts and the IRS seem to have understood this point, 
because they have never applied an entire disallowance rule in 
reimbursement cases. They arrive at the correct result, but 
without seeing that it is impossible to base this result on I.R.C. § 
265(a)(l). 
Both the problem 
decisions, Manocchio 
and its solution can be seen in two 
u. Commissioner,60 and Induni u. 
is a glitch, and the Code should probably be amended to remove it. 
58. Rev. Rul. 83-3 itself already displays confusion. The ruling lists four 
reported authorities in which the new meaning of "allocable to" has purportedly 
been applied to situations "where tax-exempt income is earmarked for a specific 
purpose and deductions are incurred in carrying out that purpose." Rev. Rul. 
83-3, 1983-1 C.B. 72, 73. Two of these, Heffelfinger v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 985 
(1945), and Rev. Rul. 74-140, 1974-1 C.B. 50, disallowed deductions for. income 
taxes, respectively foreign and state, which had been imposed on income which 
was exempt from federal tax. This is an impeccable application of the core 
original meaning of I.R.C. § 265(a)(l), not of the new reimbursement 
application. 
59. Treas. Reg.§ 1.265-l(b). 
60. 78 T.C. 989 (1982), aff'd on other grounds, 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 
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Commissioner. 61 In Manocchio, the issue was whether a pilot 
who paid for a flight training course could deduct the full cost as 
a business expense, even though the Veterans Administration 
(VA) reimbursed the pilot for 90% of the cost and the 
reimbursement was tax exempt. The tax court denied the 
deduction to the extent it was reimbursed by the VA, under the 
purported authority of I.RC. § 265(1).62 In doing so, the court 
acknowledged that the legislative history of I.RC § 265(1) 
indicated that Congress seemed principally concerned with 
denying a deduction for the direct costs of earning exempt 
income, rather than reimbursement situations like that in 
Manocchio. The court further acknowledged that an alternative 
analysis existed which would lead to the same conclusion: the 
deduction should be denied simply because it was reimbursed; 
the taxpayer did not pay the expense; the VA did.63 On appeal, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
on precisely this alternative rationale, and did not review the tax 
court's construction of I.RC. § 265(1).64 
The Ninth Circuit's analysis was correct for at least two 
reasons. First, even if the reimbursement were taxable, the same 
outcome was required, albeit by a slightly different path. The 
deduction would be allowed but the taxable reimbursement 
would restore 90% to income and result in a net deduction of 10% 
of the flight training expense.65 Thus, it is the mere fact of 
reimbursement which is decisive, not the fact that the 
reimbursement is tax-exempt.66 
1983). 
61. 98 T.C. 618 (1992), aff'd 900 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1993). 
62. Predecessor of I.R.C. § 265(a)(l), since renumbered. 
63. 78 T.C. at 998. 
64. 710 F.2d at 1402. 
65. The tax court acknowledged that the taxpayer would be left in the 
same tax situation if the reimbursement was taxable, but pointed out that this 
need not always be the case. For example, a tax-exempt reimbursement is more 
valuable than a taxable one if the taxpayer does not itemize and takes the 
standard deduction instead. Manocchio, 78 T.C. at 996. 
66. The Ninth Circuit's approach provides a principled explanation why 
gift reimbursements do not trigger disallowance of otherwise allowable 
deductions under I.R.C. § 265(a)(l). See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,506 (May 
26, 1971). "There is ample evidence in the legislative history that the section 
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Second, the direct route taken by the Ninth Circuit is clear 
and simple. More importantly, it avoids the specter of denying 
all the allocable expenses even if they exceed the amount of the 
reimbursement. In Manocchio, the tax court decided the 
taxpayer's expense was "allocable to" the tax-exempt 
reimbursement as if it were a cost of earning the reimbursement, 
apparently because the taxpayer had to submit a receipt for his 
expense. The tax court correctly permitted a deduction for the 
remaining 10% of the costs actually paid but not reimbursed. It 
is far from clear how the court arrived at this result, because it 
decided the training expenses could be allocated to only one class 
of income-the exempt reimbursement.67 If it had followed the 
I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) analysis to its logical conclusion, it would have 
been forced to deny the deduction in its entirety as "directly 
allocable to" tax-exempt income.68 After all, the taxpayer was 
required to pay 100% of the cost of flight training in order to 
obtain the 90% reimbursement. 
If the tax court had applied Treasury Reg. § 1.265-l(c) as 
written, it would have been led to a very different, and wrong, 
conclusion. That regulation prescribes that when an expense is 
"indirectly allocable to both a class of nonexempt income and a 
class of exempt income, a reasonable proportion thereof ... shall 
be allocable to each."69 There is a class of nonexempt income to 
which the expense is "indirectly" allocable-the pilot's taxable 
salary. If the expense had not been so allocable, it would not 
[265(a)] does not apply to disallow a deductible expense attributable to the 
expenditure of a completely unrestricted gift." If one concentrates on whether 
the taxpayer has paid the expense, it is clear the taxpayer has done so even 
where the expense is paid by a family member because the economic effect is 
the same as if the family member made an unrestricted gift to the taxpayer, 
who then uses the gift to pay a deductible expense. This is no different from 
paying deductible expenses out of the taxpayer's own tax-exempt interest from 
municipal bonds. This economic-equivalence analysis cannot apply to third-
party arms-length reimbursements such as scholarships, veterans' benefits, 
housing allowances and the like, because such benefits are provided to subsidize 
the targeted activity. There are no unrestricted scholarships payable regardless 
of whether one enrolls in school, or a foreign housing allowance payable 
whether or not one lives abroad. 
67. Manocchio, 78 T.C. at 995. 
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.265-l(b)-(c). 
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.265- l(c). 
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have been deductible as a business expense in the first place. It 
follows from the Regulations that the flight training deduction 
should have been denied in the same proportion that the 
taxpayer's exempt reimbursement bears to the sum of his total 
income-the pilot's taxable salary plus the reimbursement. The 
reported facts in the Manocchio opinion provide only that 
petitioner's training expenses were $4,162 in 1977, the 
reimbursement was $3, 7 43, and the deficiency was $924. The 
exact proportions cannot be calculated from these facts. 
However, assuming the taxpayer's taxable salary was about 
$30,000, it would follow that approximately 90% of the training 
expense should be deductible as allocable to producing the 
taxable income, and 10% denied as allocable to producing the 
reimbursement, which is the exact reverse of what the tax court 
correctly decided. 
The Regulations under I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) simply do not work 
in the Manocchio situation. One reason is that the terminology 
"directly and indirectly allocable" is very confusing and poorly 
chosen. Expenses which are allocated solely to one class of 
income are termed "directly allocated" in Treas. Reg. § 1.265-l(c), 
and those which are allocable partly to one class and partly to 
another are called "indirectly allocable" to each class in some 
proportion. For example, if a taxpayer recovers a personal injury 
award of $1,000, of which $600 is taxable punitive damages and 
$400 is tax-exempt, and incurs legal expenses of $100, $40 of the 
expenses would be disallowed as "indirectly allocable" to a class 
of tax-exempt income. But that $40 expense is allocable just as 
"directly" (in normal English) to the $400 exempt income as it 
would have been if the entire recovery had been exempt. 
"Wholly'' and "partly'' allocable would have been much clearer 
terms than "directly'' and "indirectly." 
The terminology problem becomes even worse in Induni. 10 
There, the taxpayer's home mortgage interest and property tax 
payments, which were slightly in excess of his tax-exempt 
housing subsidy, also had to be "allocated" for I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) 
and Manocchio to apply. The tax court ostensibly made its 
70. 98 T.C. 618. 
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allocation under the same allocation Regulation § 1.265-l(c), 
criticized above, but did not identify any class of taxable income 
to which the mortgage interest and taxes might be allocable so as 
to justify allowing a deduction for the 14.1 % of the expenses in 
excess of the exempt LQA. The reason is, obviously, there is 
none. Home mortgage interest and taxes are not expenses 
incurred in order to produce income of any kind or class. n 
Despite its garbled reading of§ 265(a)(l), however, the tax court 
did manage to get the right answer. 
In the final analysis, the tax court was not really applying 
I.RC. § 265(a)(l) at all. It was applying the Ninth Circuit's 
approach to Manocchio instead, and denying the deductions only 
to the extent necessary to avoid an unjustified double tax benefit. 
2. The Tax Benefit Rule and Revenue Ruling 83-3 
It is not entirely clear why the IRS ever thought it needed to 
invoke I.RC. § 265(a)(l) in the first place in Revenue Ruling 83-
3, Manocchio, and Induni. The Ninth Circuit's approach to 
Manocchio is fully capable of dealing with the "reimbursement" 
line of cases. It is possible that the IRS did not believe it had a 
clear statutory basis for denying the deductions offset by tax-
exempt reimbursements, or for denying the exempt status of 
reimbursements which are statutorily excludible. I.RC. § 111 
does not apply by its literal terms to the facts in Manocchio and 
Induni because the expenses and reimbursements in those cases 
both occurred in the same year. If the reimbursements had been 
made in a later year, I.RC. § 111 would have been applicable,12 
and the taxpayer would have taken the reimbursement into 
71. See Treas. Reg. § l.861-8{e){9)(ii), l.861-8T(d)(2)(iii)(D) (as amended in 
2005). Home mortgage interest and real property taxes are not definitely 
related to any class or classes of gross income for the purpose of allocating and 
apportioning expenses. 
72. Section lll{a) provides: "Gross income does not include gross income 
attributable to the recovery during the taxable year of any amount deducted in 
any prior taxable year to the extent such amount did not reduce the amount of 
tax imposed by this chapter." I.R.C. § lll(a) {2000). This statement of the 
"exclusionary" side of the tax benefit rule implies that the recovery of an item 
which was deducted in a prior year is taxable in the year of recovery of the prior 
deduction. 
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income to the extent of the prior deduction, assuming that the 
reimbursement is a recovery or an event "fundamentally 
inconsistent" with the deduction. 73 When both recovery and 
deduction occur in the same year, the only correct result can be to 
net them, as the tax court in effect did. 
Also, a "recovery" for purposes of I.RC. § 111 is usually a 
two-party affair in which the same party who originally received 
the deductible item returns it, such as a refund of state taxes or 
repayment of a debt which appeared worthless. It may be that 
the IRS did not feel confident of success in three-party 
transactions like Manocchio and Induni where the 
reimbursement comes from the government rather than from the 
payee of the deductible expense. 
C. The Error: I.RC.§ 265(a)(l) Does Not Apply at All 
By now it should be clear that I.RC. § 265(a)(l) is both 
literally and conceptually inapplicable to these "reimbursement" 
situations, and is a fortiori inapplicable to Stroud. Like I.RC. § 
111, it is intended to forestall double tax benefits, but there the 
resemblance ends. I.RC. § 265(a)(l) is designed to triage 
expenses of producing income in the sense of gains or profits, but 
the reimbursement situations do not involve profits. Pilots do 
not take training courses in order to earn reimbursements, nor 
do people live and work abroad to earn housing subsidies. Such 
reimbursements may provide an incentive in the form of a 
discount or rebate, but they are not pro.fit. By definition one 
cannot earn a profit from a reimbursement. Literally and 
etymologically, a reimbursement is a return or replacement of 
funds which one had in the first place. 
The language of the regulations under I.RC. § 265(a)(l) 
simply cannot be made to fit the reimbursement situations, and 
if the government had read its own regulations more carefully, 
the error in Revenue Ruling 83-3 would never have arisen. The 
73. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370 (1983) (holding 
distribution of cattle feed in tax-free corporate liquidation in year after feed was 
deducted is fundamentally inconsistent with prior deduction where 
shareholders acquire basis in feed, and is a "recovery" within the meaning of 
l.R.C. § 111). 
22 
2006) Deductibility of Treble Damages 
regulations speak consistently of allocating a proportion, not an 
amount, of expenses to classes of exempt and non-exempt income. 
A proportion necessarily refers to a percentage, or ratio, between 
quantities. It does not and cannot refer to a simple comparison of 
arithmetic amounts in absolute terms. But the "reimbursement" 
situations, like I.RC. § 111 cases generally, always turn on 
absolute amounts of addition and subtraction and never involve 
proportions and percentages. 
The erroneous "reimbursement" application of I.RC. § 
265(a)(l) did no harm in Manocchio and Induni-largely because 
I.RC. § 265(a)(l) was not really applied at all. But the further 
extension of this mistaken theory in Stroud unfortunately did 
produce the wrong result. In Stroud, the IRS inappropriately 
used a proportional approach to a supposed reimbursement for 
the first time, and the result was disastrous. Ultimately, the 
error is due to the fact that I.RC. § 265(a)(l) is not applicable to 
the situation in Stroud at all, either in its original or its 
"reimbursement" form. Doctors obviously do not pay treble 
damages in the current year in order to earn a tax-free 
scholarship to medical school which was paid for half a dozen 
years earlier. They pay current damages to be released from a 
current onerous work obligation in order to buy freedom for other 
career endeavors. 
Nor does the fact pattern in Stroud resemble even slightly 
the second, and illegitimate, "reimbursement" application of 
I.RC. § 265(a)(l). The taxpayers' expenses in Manocchio and 
Induni were properly denied as deductions because the 
government, not the taxpayers, paid the expenses. But neither 
the government nor anyone else reimbursed the taxpayer's triple 
damages in Stroud. The taxpayer paid the full cost of the triple 
damages herself. The only portion of the treble damages that 
should be denied a deduction is the single-damages portion 
representing the actual scholarship amount, under Skelly Oil, 74 
just as the taxpayer reported on her tax return. All the 
remaining amounts are deductible as business expenses under 
the IRS's own Revenue Ruling 68-47. 
74. 394 U.S. 678. 
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The ultimate source of the error in Stroud was that the court 
failed to see that the origin of the government's claim for 
damages was not the original receipt of the scholarship, which 
was long old and cold, but rather the taxpayer's breach of 
contract. A similar misperception of the origin of the 
government's claim for damages caused the error in Keane, 
discussed below in section III. In Keane, however, unlike m 
Stroud, the origin of the claim test was invoked explicitly. 75 
D. Origin of the Claim Test: What if There are Two Origins? 
The leading case for the origin of the claim test is United 
States v. Gilmore.76 The court in Gilmore held that the taxpayer 
could not deduct attorney's fees in a divorce action as a business 
or investment expense, even if his purpose was to protect his 
income-producing properties, because although the effects of the 
divorce would be felt in his profit-seeking activities, the claims 
arose in the personal context of divorce. 77 The Gilmore doctrine 
holds that a claim's personal or business character is to be 
determined by its origin rather than its effects. 
In Stroud, however, the issue had nothing to do with the 
future effects of the interest or damages settlement. The issue in 
Stroud was, rather, as between two possible origins in the past, 
how far back does one go? Was the origin of the claim in the 
original scholarship, or in the later breach? 
For this question there is some authority, and it is firmly on 
the side of going back only as far as the breach. Only three 
months after Gilmore was decided, the tax court considered 
whether attorney's fees for the collection of defaulted alimony 
payments were deductible under I.R.C. § 212(1) in Elliott v. 
Commissioner. 1s The Tax Court had no difficulty allowing the 
deduction, and the IRS acquiesced. 79 Although the issue was not 
discussed in Elliott, nor did the Elliot court even mention 
75. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2048-49. 
76. 372 U.S. 39 (1963). 
77. Id. 
78. 40 T.C. 304 (1963), acq. in result, 1964-2 C.B. 3. 
79. Id. (March 16, 1964). 
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Gilmore, it seems fair to read the decision as holding that a 
separate action for enforcement of collection of alimony long after 
the divorce is old and cold is independent of the divorce, and has 
its own origin in the breach of the obligation. The chain of origins 
is cut off at that point, and Gilmore does not require reaching 
further back to the more remote origin in the divorce.so 
In another example, a business deduction for training 
expenses was at issue in Hundley v. Commissioner.st Although 
the issue in Hundley was not explicitly framed as involving the 
origin· of the claim test, it could have just as easily been decided 
under that theory. The taxpayer in Hundley was a high school 
athlete whose father agreed to train him and act as his manager 
and agent. The father periodically sacrificed other employment 
to work with his son. They formally agreed that the son would 
owe his father nothing for his services if he failed to obtain a 
major-league contract. But if he succeeded, he would evenly split 
any major-league signing bonus with his father. Two years later, 
a major-league team signed the son and awarded a large bonus 
payable over five years. The taxpayer divided the bonus with his 
father as agreed and deducted the payment as a business 
expense.s2 
The IRS allowed only 10% of petitioner's deduction in 
Hundley because the taxpayer was still in high school when 
services were rendered, except for a two-week period when he 
negotiated his professional contract.s3 The general rule for 
educational expenses, as for job-seeking expenses, is that the 
taxpayer must already be engaged in a trade or business in order 
to be eligible to claim a deduction. Expenses to train for or seek a 
first job are not deductible.84 
The tax court held for the taxpayer, however, on the ground 
80. But see Wild v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 706 (1964). One year after Elliott, the 
tax court extended the deductibility of attorney's fees to include negotiating a 
right to alimony even as part of an ongoing divorce. This does not negate the 
conclusion in the text, however. And in any case, the decision appears to be 
wrongly decided for the reasons Judges Raum and Pierce give in their dissents. 
81. 48 T.C. 339 (1967). 
82. Id. at 340-44. 
83. Id. at 344. 
84. Id. (citing LR.C. § 162 (1954)). 
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that the father's fee was not due or payable at all unless and 
until the son actually entered the trade or business of 
professional baseball-the son's obligation was contingent on 
obtaining a major-league contract. Thus, the origin of the 
obligation was in his trade or business, and his payment was a 
cost of that business.85 
In the NHSC situation, as in Hundley, the taxpayer received 
educational and vocational services gratis, and tax exempt, 
subject only to a contingent duty to pay if a future business 
contingency arose. In both cases the contingency did materialize. 
And in both cases the character of the expense, business uel non, 
should be determined as of the time the contingent expense 
became actual. If at that time the taxpayer is engaged in a trade 
or business, and the payment is an expense of the business, the 
expense should be allowed as a deduction. 
If Hundley is correctly decided, Stroud represents an even 
stronger case for allowing the deduction. Both situations 
involved tax-free professional training which would be paid for 
only if a business-related contingency arose. In Hundley, the 
contingency was both expected and desired by both parties. In 
Stroud, the contingency of breach was neither desired nor 
expected by either party at the time of contract.86 Thus, the case 
for characterizing the damages in Stroud as relating to a current 
substitution of one medical practice for another seems a fortiori 
compelling. To relate it back to the remoter non-business origin 
of the contingent obligation appears strained and unrealistic. 
As Justice Jackson stated in his dissent in Lykes u. United 
States,81 joined by Justice Frankfurter, it is the proximate cause 
of an expense which matters: 
A majority of my brethren seem to think they can escape 
this conclusion by going further back in the chain of causation. 
85. Id. 
86. The treble damages are so high that no one would ever sign on the 
NHSC program with the intention of dropping out and paying them. In Dr. 
Stroud's case, the damages amounted to nearly six times the sum the 
government actually advanced to her. 
87. 343 U.S. 118 (1952) (holding that legal fees paid by donor in litigation 
over amount of gift tax owed were not deductible, before 1954 enactment of 
l.R.C. § 212(3)). 
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They say the cause of this legal expense was the gift. Of course 
one can reason, as my brethren do, that if there had been no 
gifts there would have been no tax, if there had been no tax 
there would have been no deficiency, if there were no deficiency 
there would have been no contest, if there were no contest 
there would have been no expense. And so the gifts caused the 
expense. The fallacy of such logic is that it would be just as 
possible to employ it to prove that the lawyer's fees were 
caused by having children. If there had been no children there 
would have been no gift, and if no gift no tax, and if no tax no 
deficiency, and if no deficiency no contest, and if no contest no 
expense. Hence, the lawyer's fee was not due to the contest at 
all but was a part of the cost of having babies. If this reasoning 
were presented by a taxpayer to avoid a tax, what would we 
say of it? So treacherous is this kind of reasoning that in most 
fields the law rests its conclusion only on proximate cause and 
declines to follow the winding trail of remote and multiple 
causations.SS 
A very close analogy to Stroud lies in Private Letter Ruling 
(PLR) 2001-27-022,s9 in which the taxpayer was a physician who 
sold his practice. As part of the sales agreement, the selling 
physician agreed to continue practicing with the buyer for a 
period of time under a fee-splitting arrangement, during which 
he would refer cases to the buyer, not compete with the buyer, 
and not solicit former patients.9o However, the taxpayer 
breached the agreements by going back into practice on his own, 
and was forced in arbitration to pay the buyer damages. The tax 
question was whether the taxpayer was required to capitalize the 
damages paid as part of the sales agreement, or whether the 
damages could be deducted currently as expenses separate and 
independent of the sales contract. The PLR correctly concluded 
that the damages were deductible: 
[E]ven though the first event in the fact pattern was the sale of 
88. Id. at 128. 
89. l.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-27-022 (April 4, 2001). Although the PLR 
was decided long after Stroud and Keane, it does not purport to introduce any 
change in the law and is fully consistent with what precedent did exist on the 
question of alternative origins of a claim. 
90. Id. 
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Dr. A's medical practice, a capital transaction .... Dr. B did 
not, for example, seek specific performance or rescission of the 
asset purchase agreement. The claims submitted to 
arbitration arose from Dr. A's practice of medicine over two 
years later and ... the ancillary agreements(.]91 
This is a close parallel to Stroud. One need only substitute 
the bar against deducting expenses of earning tax-exempt income 
for the bar against deducting capital outlays. For example, 
suppose a taxpayer accepts employment abroad, the income from 
which is tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 911. As a condition of 
employment, the taxpayer agrees to a restrictive covenant not to 
divulge any confidential information or solicit any of his former 
employer's clients and customers in the event he leaves to work 
for a competitor. If the taxpayer does return to the United States 
and does work for a competitor, in breach of the restrictive 
covenant, and is forced to pay damages to the first employer, it 
seems beyond doubt that the damages would be deductible. 
Under the same reasoning as PLR 2001-27-022, the damages 
would be current expenses of the United States business, rather 
than allocable to the earlier contract to earn tax-exempt income 
abroad. 
E. Capitalization Under the Indopco Regulations 
The taxpayer in Stroud, as in nearly all the treble-damages 
cases, effectively bought four years of freedom from her service 
obligation. It would make perfect sense for the taxpayer to 
capitalize the treble damages payment and amortize it over its 
life term of four years, except that at the time Revenue Ruling 
68-4 792 was in effect-and this ruling permitted an immediate 
deduction. In the meantime, however, the "Indopco 
Regulations,"93 which govern whether certain intangibles must be 
capitalized, became final as of December 1, 2003.94 These 
91. Id. 
92. 1967-1 C.B. 50 (holding employee's payment of liquidated damages, 
pursuant to employment contract for failure to complete agreed period of service 
after training, to be deductible). 
93. Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-4 to -5. 
94. See Ethan Yale, The Final INDOPCO Regulations, 5 TAX NOTES 435 
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regulations require capitalization of a payment made by a 
taxpayer in order to terminate a contract providing the payee 
with the exclusive right to acquire or use the taxpayer's property 
or services.95 This regulation appears to apply to the Stroud 
situation and to render Revenue Ruling 68-43 obsolete. The 
Ruling, however, has not been revoked. 
The Indopco Regulations generally do not purport to change 
the cost recovery rules applicable to the intangibles which must 
be capitalized. Thus, presumably a payment such as that in 
Stroud would be amortized under I.RC. § 167(a) ratably over its 
useful life of four years. This amortization, in turn, might 
remove the deductions from the reach of I.RC. §§ 162(£) and 
265(a)(l) for yet another reason: these provisions by their terms 
apply to current deductions and have no explicit effect upon 
amortization deductions allowable under I.RC.§ 167(a). 
The Indopco Regulations were not on the horizon in 1995 
when Hawronsky and Stroud were decided. On the other hand, 
Indopco v. Commissioner was decided in 1992 and had already 
laid down the dubious doctrines that capitalization is the general 
rule for expenses which have future value, and that no 
identifiable asset was necessary in order for capitalization to be 
the proper treatment.96 Though the argument would have been 
very creative at the time, the taxpayers in Hawronsky and 
Stroud might well have argued, perhaps even successfully, that 
the NHSC damages should be capitalized and amortized in light 
of Indopco, and that the amortization deductions were arguably 
outside the ambit of both I.RC. §§ 162(£) and 265(a)(l). 
III. KEANE AND THE EMPLOYEE INTEREST DEDUCTION 
In Keane v. Commissioner,97 the taxpayer was again a 
(2004). 
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(7)(i)(B). Similarly, a taxpayer who buys his 
way out of a noncompete agreement must capitalize the payment under Treas. 
Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(7)(iii), Example 3. 
96. 503 U.S. 79 (1992) (holding that professional fees for friendly takeover 
not currently deductible, and must be capitalized, because had future value and 
no requirement of separate identifiable asset for capitalization rule to apply). 
97. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2046 (1998). 
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physician who allegedly breached his NHSC service obligation. 
The facts are not developed copiously, but it appears that the 
NHSC permitted Dr. Keane a deferment of his service obligation 
for one year in order to begin his internship and residency in 
physical medicine and rehabilitation at Stanford University 
Medical Center. After his first year at Stanford, the NHSC 
refused to grant any further deferments based on "policy changes 
in the program" which are not explained in the reported 
decision.9s Dr. Keane remained to complete his residency at 
Stanford despite the NHSC's refusal to grant a further 
deferment. The NHSC declared Dr. Keane in default, and Dr. 
Keane sued for a declaratory judgment of his rights in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia.99 The NHSC appears 
to have applied these policy changes retroactively, and the suit 
was settled by compromise (essentially for single damages) 
suggesting that the NHSC was less than certain of the strength 
of its case for the full treble damages. Dr. Keane executed a 
promissory note to pay $125,000 to the government, representing 
$45,805 in original principal plus $79,195 in previously accrued 
interest. Subsequent interest on the unpaid balance of these 
sums was to accrue at the rate of 7.22%. The facts are not 
spelled out in any detail, but it appears that the parties intended 
these amounts to represent the original principal and deemed 
interest without trebling. 
The issue in Keane apparently concerned only the 
deductibility of the post-settlement interest on the unpaid 
balance of the promissory note. Indirectly, however, this raised 
some of the very same issues as in Hawronsky and Stroud. If the 
underlying principal of the promissory note, the compromised 
damages, was deductible, or was even a nondeductible business 
expense, the post-settlement interest on the note would be 
deductible as well. Therefore, it became necessary once again to 
determine whether the principal amount owed was a business 
expense. 
98. Id. at 2048. 
99. Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Keane v. Comm'r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2046 
(1998) (No. 23705-95). 
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A. Nature of the Settlement 
Special Trial Judge Dean correctly reasoned that to 
determine the tax effect of a settlement one must look to the 
underlying nature of the claim which was compromised.mo If the 
underlying claim had a business origin, the interest on the 
settlement would also have a business nature and would support 
a deduction under I.RC.§ 162. Then, however, Judge Dean held 
that the underlying dispute related to the NHSC scholarship and 
the settlement represented repayment of that scholarship. 
Because the scholarship was for medical training which had 
qualified the taxpayer for a new and different profession, the 
court said repayment of the scholarship was a nondeductible 
personal expense under Treas. Reg. § l.162-5(a). It follows, the 
court said, that the taxpayer's interest payments on the 
promissory note are also nondeductible personal expenses-in 
fact, interest on a student loan-rather than business expenses 
under either I.RC. § 162 or I.RC. § 163. Without explanation, 
the court declined the IRS's invitation to apply I.RC. § 265(a)(l) 
to deny the interest deduction, and the opinion mentions neither 
Hawronsky nor Stroud. Judge Dean's decision is curt and 
conclusory and virtually devoid of explanation. 
Judge Dean's analysis is utterly mistaken. It is true that 
when the characterization of a settlement is specified by the 
parties, that characterization will ordinarily be respected for tax 
purposes. But that rule applies only to allocations between real 
and actual claims. The government had no claim for recovery of 
a student loan. The government's only real claim against the 
taxpayer was for treble damages under 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b)(l). 
The settlement agreement itself explicitly acknowledges this 
legal basis, even if it misstates that interest had previously 
accrued. 
The Keane settlement recites that: 
Dr. Keane shall pay ... ($45,805.00) in original principal (i.e., 
the monies expended on Dr. Keane's behalf for his medical 
school tuition and expenses), plus previously accrued interest 
100. Keane, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2046. 
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totaling ... ($79, 195.00) claimed by the Secretary under 42 
U.S.C. Section 254o(b)(l)), plus additional interest on the 
unpaid balance compounded at ... (7.22%) per annum ... .io1 
The taxpayer incurred no indebtedness at the time of 
entering into the scholarship contract. And the imputed interest 
called for in the treble damages clause is not interest for tax 
purposes, but is an element of damages to compensate the 
government for its loss of the use of the money. It is well-
established that, in the absence of actual indebtedness which is 
presently enforceable, there can be no interest for tax purposes. 
The rule applies to all types of contingent debt which may 
become actual only after some intervening event. This rule 
applies, for example, to "pre-judgment interest" which is an 
element of damages but is not interest for tax purposes because 
no valid and enforceable debt is created until judgment.102 The 
IRS itself in its own GCM 39,336, which the tax court so heavily 
relied upon in Stroud, explicitly acknowledges that the imputed 
interest of the NHSC damages clause is not interest for tax 
purposes because no indebtedness was created at the time of 
making the contract, correctly citing Joseph W. Bettendorf 1da 
The Keane settlement thus cannot be in lieu of repayment of 
a scholarship loan plus student loan interest because the 
government was not entitled to, and did not make, any such 
claim. The settlement is, of course, in lieu of the treble damages. 
And the tax treatment of the treble damages has been 
established above in the treatment of Stroud; the original 
scholarship amount is nondeductible under Skelly Oil, and the 
imputed "interest" is an element of damages which is deductible 
as a business expense.104 
101. Id. at n.3. 
102. See, e.g., Rozpad v. Comm'r, 154 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998); see generally 
Alice G. Abreu, Distinguishing Interest from Damages: A Proposal for a New 
Perspective, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 373 (1992). 
103. 3 B.T.A. 378 (1926) (finding that damages for wrongful detention of 
funds is not interest on indebtedness for tax purposes). 
104. There is one possible loose end. The amount paid might have been 
allocated for tax purposes in exact proportion to the amounts of the underlying 
claims. In other words, the $46,000 of "principal" might have been treated as 
one-third original principal and two-thirds trebled, or roughly $15,333 return of 
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B. Employee Business Interest 
The only issue in Keane was the deductibility of the current 
interest paid on the settlement. Unfortunately, the proper 
question to determine the issue was never even raised, much less 
decided: whether the interest was employee business interest or 
self-employed business interest. We have already determined 
that the interest cannot be student interest on an educational 
loan and that it must be business interest. However, that is not 
the end of the question regarding the deductibility of the interest. 
The identical question arose in Stroud because she did not pay 
all of her damages at once, but entered into a repayment 
agreement over time and paid interest on the promissory note. 
The deductibility of this current interest was decided against the 
taxpayer in Stroud, as in Keane. If the Stroud court was right in 
denying a deduction for the damages under I.R.C. § 265(a)(l), 
then denying the current interest deduction would also have been 
correct because the current interest would have been 
nondeductible as an additional cost "allocable to" the tax-exempt 
scholarship, or because it would have fallen within the residual 
category of non-deductible "personal" interest under I.RC. § 
163(h)(l)(A).105 Note, however, that if the court had denied the 
deduction of the damages under the Hawronsky theory that 
I.RC. § 162(£) applied, the deduction for current interest would 
scholarship and $30,667 trebled damages, and the $79,000 or "previously 
accrued interest" might have been regarded as one-third imputed interest of 
about $26,333, and the other two-thirds or the remaining $53,667 as the 
trebling of the imputed interest. This would have had no other tax effect than 
to reduce the non-deductible amount from $46,000 down to $15,333, with all the 
balance remaining deductible. It would have had no tax effect upon the 
deductibility of the current interest paid on these settlement amounts because 
both types of principal are business payments (even though some portion was 
not deductible). Given the language of the settlement agreement and the 
apparent intention of the parties, it seems preferable to respect the settlement 
allocation as written because the allocation is reasonable and both claims are 
genuine. Also, it seems more in the spirit of Skelly Oil to forbid deduction of the 
full scholarship amount received tax-free in order to avoid any amount of double 
tax benefit. 
105. Judge Norton's opinion on this point is so cryptic and confusing that it 
is not entirely clear why he denied the deduction for current interest. See 906 
F. Supp. at 995. 
33 
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 1 
have been allowable. Interest on a penalty is not itself a penalty, 
and because I.RC. § 162(£) applies only to otherwise deductible 
business expenses, interest on the disallowed damages would 
have been deductible trade or business interest, at least on the 
assumption that Hawronsky was self-employed. 
Employment status is the wrinkle. After the 1986 Act, 
business interest incurred by an employee is not deductible at all. 
This interest is now termed "personal" and is therefore 
nondeductible under the rather clumsy language of I.R.C. § 
163(h)(l) and (2)(a).106 Legislative history is apparently non-
existent for this absurdly harsh rule. Most other unreimbursed 
employee business expenses are cut down by the 2% floor of 
I.R.C. § 67, which is itself largely unjustified; but at least the 
deductions are allowed in some part if they are substantial. By 
contrast, and inexplicably, employee business interest is not 
deductible at all. It may be that the drafters of this rule thought 
that an occasional business interest expense of an employee was 
likely to be limited to de minimis amounts on a credit card, or 
that if the interest expense were legitimately for business, the 
employer would have reimbursed the expense. If the rule rests 
upon either of these assumptions, the drafters were sorely 
mistaken, as can be seen in McKay u. Commissioner.101 
In McKay, the taxpayer's interest expense of some $44,000 on 
a loan to pay his legal fees was denied, even though some 
amounts were paid while the taxpayer was self-employed, on the 
ground that the taxpayer's litigation grew out of his earlier 
employment.10s The taxpayer's suit was against his former 
employer for wrongful discharge and related causes of action. 
Thus, the rule of McKay seems to be that it is the purpose of the 
borrowing which determines whether business expense is 
disallowed as employee interest,109 and not the employment 
status of the taxpayer at the time of payment or even at the time 
106. "[T]he term 'personal interest' means any interest ... other than - (A) 
interest ... allocable to a trade or business (other than the trade or business of 
providing services as an employee) .... " I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) (2000). 
107. 102 T.C. 465 (1994). 
108. Id. 
109. The facts indicate that the taxpayer was discharged in 1983, but did 
not begin his lawsuit or his borrowings until a year later. 48 T.C. at 14, 36. 
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of borrowing .110 
Thus, whether the current interest was deductible on the 
taxpayers' obligations in both Stroud and Keane would appear to 
depend exclusively on the taxpayers' purpose for incurring the 
obligation. If the taxpayer signed the note to buy her freedom to 
practice, or to continue practicing, medicine as an employee, the 
interest, whenever paid (apparently even if paid after later 
switching to self-employment) would be entirely non-deductible 
as employee business interest. If the taxpayer signed the note to 
practice, or continue practicing, medicine while self-employed, 
the interest would be deductible in full when paid. This slightly 
absurd question was--or should have been-the only relevant 
question regarding deductibility of the interest. But the question 
was never raised, much less briefed, in either Stroud or Keane.m 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit blindly affirmed the district court's 
misapplication of I.R.C. § 265(a)(l) in Stroud, and approved the 
district court's conclusion that the current interest on the note 
was personal as well.112 But the Fourth Circuit did reverse the 
complete denial of the interest deduction and allowed a partial 
deduction for the years 1989 and 1990-years when the personal 
interest deduction was still being phased out. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The lessons to be learned from these erroneous decisions are 
not limited to uncovering and understanding the mistakes 
lawyers and the courts committed in Stroud and Keane, nor to 
recognizing the threat that the IRS will continue to unreasonably 
extend its arsenal of disallowance provisions under I.R.C. §§ 
110. This is in accordance with Treas. Reg. § l.163-8T(c), which asserts that 
debt is to be allocated (as business, personal or otherwise) in accordance with 
the use of the loan proceeds, and that if there are no loan proceeds (as in the 
NHSC obligations), then allocated as if there were proceeds; i.e. as if used for 
whatever purpose the obligation were incurred. Treas. Reg. § l.163-8T(c)(3)(ii). 
Interest paid is to be allocated in the same manner as the principal, regardless 
of when the interest is paid. Treas. Reg. § l.163-8T(c)(2)(ii). 
111. Not enough facts were recited in either reported decision to make it 
clear what the outcome should have been. 
112. Stroud v. United States, No. 95-3139, 1996 WL 477240 (4th Cir. Aug. 
23, 1996). 
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162(£), 265(a)(l), and 163(h) into new and unpredictable reaches. 
The most significant danger is that the IRS seems increasingly 
aggressive and unreasonable in its interpretations of law, and 
the courts seem uncritically deferential to the government. If the 
IRS is outgunned by big business, as is often asserted, it seems 
equally true that the IRS in turn outguns relatively defenseless 
taxpayers with whom the mainstream business tax bar is largely 
unconcerned. 
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